An Act respecting countering foreign interference
Context
Bill C-70 is the government’s response to allegations of foreign interference following a year-long consultation process conducted by Public Safety Canada.
Commission Findings
The final report prepared by the Foreign Interference Commission highlights how the past Canadian Federal Elections in 2019 and 2021 were influenced by foreign actors such as China and Russia.
Final Conclusion
While the report acknowledges the reality of foreign interference in Canadian elections, it nevertheless concludes that
“foreign interference did not impact which party formed the Government in 2019 and 2021.”
Summary
What is in Bill C-70?
Bill C-70 is a four part proposal. Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act, part 2 amends the Security of Information Act, part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act, and part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act. These expansions of powers, particularly to CSIS, have the potential to engage privacy interests under section 8 of the Charter.
Part 1: Amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act
Datasets
A dataset policy was introduced in the CSIS Act in 2019, granting CSIS the power to collect and use datasets that are relevant to CSIS’ duties and functions of protecting against threats to the security of Canada.
Bill C-70 would clarify and remove ambiguities regarding which datasets CSIS is allowed to gather, specifically those datasets which are publicly available, belong to an approved class, or predominantly relate to non-Canadians (para. 11.05). It would also extend the time limits for how long a dataset may be kept from two to five years for Canadian datasets and five to ten years for non-Canadian datasets (para 20). Additionally, the Bill would allow CSIS to not only “query” a dataset in exigent circumstances, but also “exploit” it, which refers to computational analyses for the purpose of obtaining intelligence that would not otherwise be apparent (para 11.22).
| Dataset Type | Retention Limit Extension |
|---|---|
| Canadian Datasets | Extended from 2 to 5 years (para 20) |
| Non-Canadian Datasets | Extended from 5 to 10 years (para 20) |
Collecting Information Located Outside Canada
Section 16 of the CSIS Act authorizes CSIS to collect foreign intelligence from sources located within Canada. However, this creates a potential gap since CSIS would not be able to get necessary information if it were located outside Canada. Bill C-70 would close this gap by permitting CSIS to gather foreign intelligence that affects Canadians even when that data is located outside Canada (para 31).
Disclosure of Information
Bill C-70 seeks to expand CSIS’s authority to disclose information under section 19 of the CSIS Act. Currently, CSIS can disclose information to “peace officers” for investigations. The bill would broaden this to “any person” with jurisdiction to investigate federal or provincial law contraventions (para 34(a)).
Preservation/Production Orders & Warrants
Bill C-70 empowers CSIS to request Federal Court judges to issue preservation and production orders and warrants:
- Preservation Order: A preservation order requires third parties to preserve information relevant to national security investigations for up to 90 days (para 37).
- Production Order: A production order compels third parties to produce such information if it aids in national security investigations, with judicial oversight to ensure necessity and public interest (para 37).
- Warrant: A warrant permits CSIS to access and collect information directly, under strict judicial authorization, valid for not longer than 120 days (para 38).
Part 2 – Measures to counter foreign interference
Foreign Interference Offences
Bill C-70 proposes amendments to the Security of Information Act (SOIA), introducing three new offences related to foreign interference and modifying an existing offence. The revised section 20 of SOIA will criminalize “intimidation, threats, or violence” by foreign or terrorist influences, simplifying prosecution by removing the need to prove specific purposes or potential harms to Canadian interests in some cases (para 53). The new offences include the commission of indictable acts on behalf of a foreign entity, engaging in deceptive actions or omissions that prejudice national safety or interests, and conducting political interference directed by foreign entities (para. 53). Each offence carries a maximum life imprisonment penalty and mandates consecutive sentencing with other related offences. These changes aim to strengthen Canada’s legal framework against foreign threats and interference in national affairs.
Amending the Criminal Code’s Sabotage Offence
Bill C-70 proposes to modernize the existing sabotage offence under section 52 of the Criminal Code and introduces two new related offences. The amendments clarify that sabotage must involve an intent to harm Canada’s safety, security, or defense, excluding those participating in advocacy, protests, or dissent without intent to cause specified harms. The bill adds an offence for interfering with “essential infrastructure”, defined broadly to include services vital to public well-being, requiring the intent to cause serious harm (para 61). Another offence targets the creation or distribution of devices designed for sabotage which would carry a sentence of not more than 10 years.
What are the concerns with Part 2 of Bill C 70?
The Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council (CMPAC) has expressed worry that the expansion of sabotage to include interference with “essential infrastructure” might stifle legitimate and democratic protest. This could arise in situations where peaceful and lawful protest might temporarily disrupt or block access to public spaces may be interpreted as blocking access to essential infrastructure. Further, CMPAC has expressed concern about the lack of clear definitions of what constitutes “intimidation” and “interference”, which may lead to them being interpreted subjectively to counter lawful dissent.
Part 3 – Measures relating to the protection of information
This section proposes to amend the Canada Evidence Act to regulate the disclosure and protection of sensitive information in administrative proceedings before the Federal Court and Court of Appeal. It would replace existing frameworks and regulate those cases involving sensitive or potentially injurious information which pertains to national security, defense, or international relations. If sensitive information might be disclosed in a judicial review or appeal, participants must notify the Attorney General, who can then authorize or challenge the disclosure before a judge. The judge may appoint a special counsel to represent non-governmental parties in closed sessions, ensuring fairness and protecting interests. Judges can decide whether to disclose sensitive information, balancing public and national interests. This proposal also allows the Attorney General to block disclosure through a certificate, subject to judicial review (para 84).
Part 4 – Enactment of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act
Bill C-70 proposes a new Act addressing the issue of foreign states and their proxies influencing Canadian political processes in a way which endangers Canadian democracy, sovereignty, and values. This Act will strengthen national security and raise public awareness of the efforts of foreign entities to influence political or governmental processes in Canada.
Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner
The Act would appoint a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner. Individuals and entities must report to the Commissioner any arrangements with foreign entities intended to influence Canadian political or governmental processes, such as legislative proceedings, policy development, or elections. This information will be made public through a registry (part 4, para 8).
The Commissioner is granted investigative powers to ensure compliance with the Act, including summoning individuals to give evidence and producing documents. The Act also introduces new offences, such as failing to report arrangements with foreign principals, which could lead to imprisonment. These offences are designed to uphold the Act’s goals by ensuring accurate and timely disclosure of relevant information to the Commissioner. Administrative monetary penalties can be imposed for violations of the Act, with the Commissioner issuing notices of violation.
All paragraph citations from the First Reading of the Bill, available online at: https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-70/first-reading
Public Concern
What are the concerns from Part 4 of Bill C 70?
Much of the public worry comes from unanswered questions regarding definitions and scope. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has expressed concern that the Bill does not offer much detail on how the Registry will be maintained, what information is required to be made public, and who is outside of the Registry’s scope.
As it stands, individuals who enter into “arrangements” with “foreign principals” whose activities related to the “political or governmental” process in Canada would have to provide the Commissioner with a list of information.
The CCLA indicates that the vagueness of this section’s key terms could lead to situations where individuals who engage with international entities such as:
- foreign-owned academic institutions,
- media, or
- charities
would be required to submit information about their personal activities to the Registry. Such a situation might threaten democratic accountability.
References
- https://foreigninterferencecommission.ca/fileadmin/user_upload/Foreign_Interference_Commission_-_Initial_Report__May_2024__-_Digital.pdf
- CSIS’ scope is defined under sections 12, 15, or 16 of the CSIS act, available here: https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-23/page-4.html#docCont
- https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-70/first-reading